Maritime Security Co-operation Between India and Korea

 

Maritime security cooperation in South East Asia is still in the early stages of development. The interests of various stakeholders in maritime security generally overlap, but sometimes are in conflict too. Not only have incidents of piracy and ship hijacking in the waters between the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea increased, but they have become more technologically sophisticated, with modern weapons and gunboats being used, and their link to Al Qaeda groups is becoming increasingly manifest. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard are fully conversant with this threat and have been engaged in discussions and exercises with the navies of the United States, Australia, Japan, Singapore and others to deal with the emerging challenge.

Being an export-dependent economy and dependent on energy imports from the Persian Gulf, the ROK cannot shy away for too long from discussing with India the potential for cooperation in the field of maritime security. India is emerging as a competitive destination for the ROK's export-oriented foreign direct investment (FDI). There are three motives that have shaped Korean interest in India: resource seeking, market seeking and efficiency seeking. Initially, Korean companies invested abroad in resource rich areas. This was followed by foreign markets seeking FDI. In the course of time and in some countries, Korean FDI sought local efficiencies in terms of labor productivity, infrastructure and so on to be able to then use such places as production bases for export to third markets.

Till recently only China met all three objectives, and so has attracted huge Korean FDI, as it also has for similar reasons from Japan. However, more recently, India has also become an attractive FDI destination on all three counts for Korean companies, even though it still lags behind China in terms of the quality of infrastructure and the productivity of investment. Hyundai, LG and Samsung find their India operations profitable, however more reform and better infrastructure is required.

If Korean FDI in India was only of the domestic market-seeking type, the ROK need not engage India in a dialogue on high seas security. However, with both resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI coming to India, the ROK must worry about the safety of ports, coastlines and, more importantly, the sea lines of communication. India does engage the APEC member nations in a dialogue on maritime security through the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) where the ROK is also a member. However, the ROK must directly engage India in a dialogue going beyond questions of economic reform and trade liberalization and encompassing national and maritime security given the emerging terrorist threat and the 11/26 incident.

This also underscores the need for India to be actively engaged with APEC on economic issues. APEC membership entails the further pursuit of trade and investment liberalization. A logical consequence of India's "Look East" policy should be its greater integration into all forums of the APEC region.

Our concept of security has broadened. It now includes considerations of environmental security, safety, food security and human security, as well as of resource security.
In the oceans, relevant threats include illegal unregulated and unreported fishing, ocean acidification, sea level rise, pollution, loss of marine biodiversity and habitats and marine natural hazards. Safety and security can also be closely related, again particularly in the maritime domain. Climate change and its implications are now regarded as having significant security dimensions.

An important quality of non-traditional security is that the main threats are of a shared nature and are not direct threats to the interests of any one nation. Dealing with these threats invites a cooperative response. Maritime energy security is one of the most important elements needed to ensure stable energy supplies for the fast growing Asian economies. Major user states must contribute to the security of choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait. India and Korea can play an important role in maintaining the security of these strategic sea lanes.

Almost all the traded goods between India and Korea pass through the Malacca Strait. This strait is of more strategic significance to Korea as the energy supplies from the Middle East pass through these straits. Piracy in Malacca has shown a gradual decline in these past few years. This decline is the result of efforts ashore by the local law enforcement authorities in Malaysia and Indonesia. Piracy, which was an acceptable vocation within local communities until recently, has lost its appeal to the local youth. This is in great contrast to the lawless situation in the Gulf of Aden where the recent success of pirates has lured the local Somali fishermen into becoming pirates.

India has played an active role in fighting the menace of Piracy in Gulf of Aden. Its warship was instrumental in the sinking of one pirate mother ship. The Indian Navy actively protects the Indian-owned tonnage passing through the Gulf of Aden by escorting ships laden with goods through these treacherous areas. Seoul, on the other hand, is realizing that it is a major maritime power with strategic interests as well as pressing economic challenges. Moreover, the ROK has come under greater pressure from the United States to assume a greater security profile and play a more active role in maritime security in her own national interest.

India and Korea can have greater maritime cooperation by following the five point agenda. Firstly, the Indian and Korean navies can conduct joint exercises involving search and rescue, anti-submarine warfare and anti-terror tactics. Both navies should conduct more flag-showing visits to build stronger and more influential relationships. To mark the beginning of a strong relationship, a large naval exercise needs to be conducted between both countries in the Indian Ocean region.

Secondly, Indian ships can help escort Korean tonnage passing through the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden and the waters of the Seychelles, and the Korean naval vessels should come to the assistance of Indian interests in the Pacific region. These roles will be mutually beneficial and will relieve the Korean Navy of the duty to guard its tonnage in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.

Thirdly, both countries can establish joint maritime centers at choke points and specifically can play an active role in the Strait of Hormuz and assist American warships operating in the region to secure the energy supplies for both countries. The Strait of Hormuz is of significance to both countries as they have a large requirement of energy to meet the demand from a fast growing economy. A Memorandum of Understanding should be signed for establishing such a center and the United States can be a party to such an understanding given the close relations that both countries enjoy with the Americans.

Fourthly, both countries can cooperate in the area of training maritime personnel. As Korea has a great tradition of shipbuilding and has the best technical knowhow in the area of ship design and assembly, it can train the manpower from Indian shipyards such as the one at Kochi and Vishakhapatnam. In return, India has a great seagoing tradition and has the largest pool of seagoing officers in the world. Korea can utilize this resource to develop its own ship management and operational capabilities. Moreover, there is a requirement for more exchange programs between training establishments between both countries. Southern Naval Command at Kochi regularly accepts personnel from various Southeast Asian nations.

Fifthly, there is vast potential for Indo-Korean cooperation in the modernization of their conventional naval forces with state-of-the-art technologies from each other and from friendly countries like the United States and Israel. Both countries have to cope with the objectives of the industrially-advanced Western countries in general, and the U.S. in particular, of maintaining long-term exclusive control over sophisticated technologies. It is against this background that there are very good prospects for Indo-Korean collaboration in developing their respective indigenous defense industries. India, which has a vast pool of scientists and engineers, a thriving high-tech industry, and an advanced and promising modernization program, can play an important role in the South Korean modernization of its conventional naval forces.

With regards to military relationships, personal military-to-military relationships are the first steps in building trust. These personal relationships are very useful in the day-to-day military interactions between countries. Indeed, in those moments when disaster or crisis demands the most from us, our relationships may yet pay the highest dividend. Navies need to know how to work together before a crisis or disaster hits. These efforts confirm that there need be no contradiction between defending our country's sovereign rights and sailing together against the common threats to our welfare.

A prime example of this is in the Straits of Malacca, as discussed above, where patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have drastically reduced piracy.

The Economic Community of Central African States is another example. These nations agreed to work together on patrolling waters of mutual interest and to monitor an operations center in Cameroon. Making this international cooperation more effective is important for the future. Information sharing and the pursuit of maritime domain awareness remain focuses for partner nations.

Our goal should now be to bridge the regional security awareness initiatives in support of yet broader awareness and partnerships. Besides information-sharing, we must also work toward greater interoperability. There are many ways to improve our interoperability and lessons learned of how to work together. Those lessons start again at the personal level.

Senior level partnerships are important, but it is on the decks of ships where the partnerships pay off. Both India and the ROK need to encourage the interaction of their young sailors, noncommissioned officers and officers. These kinds of contacts have a lasting impact and help in building trust. In an age of instant communication and imperfect translation software, we have unparalleled opportunities to ensure that the naval chiefs a generation from now will have known each other since their earliest days at sea, regardless of distance or language differences. This kind of personal knowledge of each other helps develop better understanding and respect for each other.

Training together and exercising together remain the best ways to facilitate this communication. However, there is still a greater need to facilitate and expand this communication. The time spent in learning and improving interoperability is time well spent when real issues such as maritime piracy are faced. The presence of navies from all over the world in the Gulf of Aden is truly unprecedented and very much needed for a security challenge that affects such a large ocean area.

The common use of the high seas has been a driver of international cooperation and institution-building for centuries. Today, in the early years of the 21st century, I am convinced that our new partnerships - informal as well as formal, local as well as global - are writing a new chapter in the development of the Asia Pacific region.

The objective of the India-Korea alliance is not to form a military alliance or contain any one country. But it will ensure that not just one country is able to dominate the critical sea lanes of communication. It will construct a new balance of power in the region that will help both countries in establishing a strong foothold in the region and thus ensuring growth and prosperity. As for India and Korea, it is high time that we must rediscover the forgotten history of this sub-continent's maritime links with the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region, that has reached out as far as the Korean peninsula.

The writer is a Master Mariner with 11 years of experience in the International Shipping Industry. He is the member of Company of Master Mariners of India (CMMI). At present he heads Moim Consulting in Busan, South Korea.

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